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Since the publication of Professor Robert Rasmussen's landmark article
in 1992,1 the central focus of bankruptcy scholarship has been to discover a
practical method of contracting for bankruptcy procedure.2 The task is
difficult because a debtor may have hundreds or even thousands of creditors
whose interests will be interdependent at the time of insolvency. The
contract by which they select a bankruptcy procedure optimal for the
particular firm would have to be a contract among all of them, and it would
have to be capable of changing over the years as the firm evolved
The theory of business bankruptcy that dominated the scholarship until
recently-Professors Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson's "creditor's
bargain" theory-was based on the assumption that actually making such a
contract was impossible. Instead, Baird and Jackson sought to discover and
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impose on all parties to bankruptcy cases the contract they would have
chosen had contracting been possible.4
In the early 1990s, several bankruptcy scholars challenged the
assumption that such contracting was impossible.5 One, Rasmussen, also
proposed a method for adjusting the contract over time. The state would
offer a "menu" of alternative bankruptcy regimes, and business debtors
would select among them by inserting provisions in their corporate
charters.6 Changes in the election would be made by charter amendment.
Prospective lenders could discover the debtor's chosen bankruptcy regime
from the public record and refuse to extend credit if they did not approve.8
Rasmussen's proposal was of doubtful practicality,9 in part because all
parties had to update their information and recontract with changing
conditions. But the proposal demonstrated that regimes of actual
contracting were possible, and it inspired other scholars to attempt to
improve upon it.'0
The most ambitious of those attempts to date is the one by Professor
Alan Schwartz that was published in The Yale Law Journal in 1998.
Schwartz proposed an elegant scheme in which the debtor would need to
negotiate changes only with the most recent creditor and in which that
creditor could rely upon information voluntarily disclosed by the debtor."
4. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725. 728
(1984) (" Bankruptcy's rules therefore can be seen as an attempt to implement the type of
collective and compulsory system that rational creditors would privately agree to if they could
bargain together before the fact.").
5. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) (proposing contracting through the design of
securities); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter II, 101
YALE L.J. 1043 (1992) (same).
6. See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 54-55, 112.
7. See id.
8. Rasmussen later described his proposal as follows:
Firms would be allowed to change the bankruptcy provisions of their charters (or
include a new provision if one does not already exist) subject to two constraints. The
first is that there be a lag between the time a firm announces that it intends to change its
bankruptcy selection and when that change is effective. This lag would give the
creditors the opportunity to examine the proposed change. If they ascertained that the
change was an attempt to enrich the managers at their expense, they could ... initiate
an insolvency proceeding prior to the change taking effect.
Robert K. Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy at Home and Abroad, in THE FALL AND
RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 311, 319 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
9. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist
Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 696, 738-42 (1999) (criticizing Rasmussen's proposal on the
grounds that the cost of contracting would be excessive and that involuntary creditors would not
have the opportunity to contract); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1811 (noting that Rasmussen's
solution "may founder over the problem that because the optimality of a bankruptcy system is
state-dependent, it also can be time-dependent").
10. See Block-Lieb, supra note 2, at 9-28 (describing the contractual bankruptcy literature
and critiquing the various proposals).
11. See Schwartz, supra note 3.
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Had it worked, Schwartz's method would have been in some respects
more efficient than Rasmussen's. 1 2 But what was most intriguing was
Schwartz's claim to have proven, with the precision of an elaborate
economic model, that permitting parties to contract for the bankruptcy
systems they preferred would be superior to the current system of "state-
supplied bankruptcy." 3 That is, Schwartz asserted that his model proved
the superiority of contract bankruptcy over the current system in a manner
applicable to the real world, 4 and he advocated a change in current law
based upon it. 5
Though scholars have questioned some of the assumptions underlying
Schwartz's model as unrealistic, 6 to date his proof has been accepted as
correct on its assumptions. 7 Rasmussen himself hailed it as "a major
contribution to the bankruptcy literature" that "provides the first formal
confirmation of the intuition that firms, acting prior to the onset of financial
distress, are better able to select the appropriate bankruptcy procedure than
is a mandatory rule ... ." "8
Schwartz's proof is defective. The model employs materially
inconsistent assumptions and the proof reaches its goal only through
miscalculations from those assumptions. To understand the nature and
significance of these errors, the reader must first understand the operation
of the model. To accomplish that, this Essay proceeds by restating the
purpose and essential assumptions of Schwartz's model and tracing his
proof in nontechnical language. To facilitate comparison with the technical
language of Schwartz's essay, it includes extensive footnotes to the essay,
uses verbal expressions that correspond to the symbolic expressions of
12. In particular, only the debtor and one creditor would have had to analyze the
circumstances and negotiate updates to the bankruptcy contract. See id. at 1834.
13. Schwartz makes the claim in two sentences, whose placement in the essay indicates that
they are asserted to flow from the model rather than from arguments made in other parts of the
essay. The first is that " [t]he legal prohibition on contracting for bankruptcy systems is inefficient
because the ban requires parties always to use 'renegotiation contracts' even when other contracts
would generate higher expected values for creditors." Id. at 1831. The second, which follows the
first by only a few sentences, is that " [flirms today cannot finance projects that they would be
able to finance if the ban were repealed." Id at 1832.
14. See id; id- at 1838 ("In sum, if the ban on contracting for bankruptcy systems were
repealed... the current U.S. system would make a better contribution to the maximization of
social wealth."); id at 1850 ("Requiring parties to use a single, state-supplied bankruptcy system
does not maximize the value of bankruptcy estates ....").
15. See id ("[mhe state should permit parties to contract for the bankruptcy system that they
prefer."). Later he describes "[tihis Essay's central claim" as " captured in a variation on a trendy
slogan: Privatize bankruptcy." Id. at 1851.
16. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 8, at 314-15 (objecting to Schwartz's assumption that
the only choice for bankruptcy contracting is between liquidation and reorganization); Block-
Lieb, supra note 2, at 60 (arguing that Schwartz "too quickly presumes the existence of an
appropriate signal" for partially renegotiation-proof contracts).
17. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 600 (" Professor Alan Schwartz has shown that
[bankruptcy] procedure contracts can benefit both debtors and creditors.").
18. Rasmussen, supra note 8, at 319.
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Schwartz's model, and indicates the symbolic expression in brackets when
such a verbal expression is used.
The three-part task Schwartz sets for himself is to demonstrate that a set
of bankruptcy contracts exists that would induce optimal bankruptcy
choices even though "[a] firm may have numerous creditors; these creditors
may lend at different times; and they may have different preferences about
bankruptcy systems." 9 He constructs his model in three stages that
correspond to these three parts. At its first stage, the model proves that "a
set of contracts that will induce optimal bankruptcy choices exists" when a
debtor has numerous creditors." Expanded to the second stage, the model
purports to prove that "[a] set of contracts exists that will achieve the
results described above even though creditors lend at different times."2
Further expanded to its third stage, the model purports to prove that
inconsistent preferences among creditors would not prevent the parties from
reaching agreement.
Part I of this Essay describes the first stage of Schwartz's model and his
proof that contracting would occur on the assumptions at that stage. Part II
describes the extension of the model to its second stage and demonstrates
that Schwartz has ignored in this stage assumptions that were crucial to the
first stage. Part III describes the further extension of the model to its third
stage. It demonstrates that Schwartz's contracting solution to the conflict
between junior and senior creditors fails because it misapprehends the
source of conflict between them, and that his contracting solution to the
conflict between trade and other creditors-majority rule-fails because it
is inconsistent with his second stage solution-the last contract governs.
Part IV examines the sparse empirical evidence to conclude that actual
bankruptcy contracting is proceeding in directions less benign than those
predicted by Schwartz and other theorists. Part V summarizes the
arguments presented and conclusions reached in the preceding parts.
I. STAGE ONE: CONTRACTING WHEN ALL CREDITORS
LEND AT THE SAME TIME
Schwartz's model assumes only a single subject for bankruptcy
contracting: whether the case should be a reorganization or liquidation.2
19. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1822.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1833.
22. See id. at 1823. Schwartz does not explain why proof that a bankruptcy contract was
superior to the current system in one respect, the choice between reorganization and liquidation.
would prove that bankruptcy contracts were superior to the current system in all respects. Cf
Rasmussen, supra note 8, at 315 ("Schwartz does not propose, as his model suggests. that
Congress amend the Bankruptcy Code so as to allow firms to enter into contracts regulating
whether the firm should file for liquidation or reorganization."). Schwartz's unstated premise
320 [Vol. 109: 31!7
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For each firm, reorganization or liquidation might be best, depending on the
state of facts existing at the time of bankruptcy.2 The obvious solution to
the contracting problem presented-a contract providing that the firm will
choose liquidation when liquidation is best [0] and reorganization when
reorganization is best [0]-is blocked by an assumption that the contract
would be too expensive to write. 4
The model assumes that the firm makes the choice between
reorganization and liquidation at the time of bankruptcy,' knows at that
time which is best,' knows the amount of the loss it will inflict on the
creditors if it chooses reorganization when liquidation is best,' but cannot
be trusted to choose the best because its incentives are biased in favor of
reorganization.2 8 The bias results from the firm's ' assumed ability to obtain
"private benefits"30 in reorganization in excess of those that would be
available in liquidation [bR - bL]. Though the firm knows the amount of
appears to be that a bankruptcy contract superior in any particular respect could track the current
system in every other respect. Because the contract was superior in one respect and inferior in
none, it would have to be superior as a whole.
23. Schwartz designates the state of the world in which reorganization is best as 0, and the
state in which liquidation is best as 0 . See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1825.
24. As Schwartz puts it, " IThe ex post circumstances and their relation to what an optimal
bankruptcy choice would be are too costly to describe in a contract. Thus contracts of the form
'Choose R[eorganization] if certain facts obtain but otherwise choose L[iquidationl' are
excluded." Id at 1823.
25. See idU
26. See id. ("Thus parties know after insolvency which of the two bankruptcy systems would
maximize monetary returns.").
27. See id at 1828 n.59 (" [The firm can predict the private benefits that it later may realize
in bankruptcy and its expected monetary return. As a consequence, the firm can calculate the
optimal bribe s" to include in the contract."). The firm could make such a calculation only by
knowing YL, (the firm's monetary return from choosing liquidation) and Y, (the firm's monetary
return from inefficiently choosing reorganization) because s" depends upon them. See id. at 1828.
28. See id. at 1825 ("It is assumed that the firm derives greater private benefits from system
R whichever state of the world obtains ex post-i.e., the firm will always choose system R unless
it is constrained by ex ante contract or by ex post renegotiation.").
29. In the model to which this reply is directed, the firm, not the managers or shareholders.
reaps the private benefits. See id at 1824 ("The firm makes an optimal bankruptcy choice when it
picks the system that maximizes the sum of monetary returns and private benefits."). This
assumption has a tendency to confuse readers because (1) the real-world correlates of private
benefits are consumed outside the firm by managers or shareholders and (2) most of the private
benefits are, by their nature, taken from the firm. Examples include "the excess consumption of
leisure while employed, and the opportunity to continue to be paid a salary." d Schwartz
apparently makes this counterintuitive assumption as a means of excluding the shareholder-
manager conflict from the scope of his essay. See id. at 1825-26 & n.56.
This exclusion conceals a practical problem with any scheme that bribes a firm to file for
liquidation. To have the desired effect, the bribe must not only be in the optimal amount- it must
also be divided optimally among what may be numerous managers and shareholders. This
presents an additional, formidable contracting problem that must be solved before one can
conclude that bankruptcy contracting is feasible. I am indebted to Ted Janger for this insight.
30. Schwartz states that "[t]hese benefits are the pleasure or status derived from running the
firm, the excess consumption of leisure while employed, and the opportunity to continue to be
paid a salary." I at 1824.
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these private benefits,3 the model assumes that "lending agreements...
cannot ban or regulate private benefits by contract" because they are
"unverifiable." 32 By that, Schwartz means that "the parties cannot establish
in court the monetary value of these benefits, nor can they show that the
firm is consuming excessively." 
33
Schwartz's solution to the contracting problem thus presented is a
contract in which the parties agree ex ante that whether the firm chooses
reorganization or liquidation, the creditors will permit the firm to keep, as a
"bribe," a percentage [s] of the firm's insolvency monetary return [y].' He
proves the optimal percentage [s'] to be the ratio that the private benefit to
the firm of choosing an ill-advised reorganization [b, - b-L,] bears to the
increased monetary return the firm would enjoy from correctly choosing
liquidation when it was efficient [YLL - Y.R].35 Although he assumes that
percentage is unverifiable, he also assumes that the firm has all the
information necessary to calculate it at the time the firm borrows. 6 Finally,
he assumes that the creditors may not have the knowledge necessary to
calculate the optimal bribe percentage [s'].
37
On these assumptions, Schwartz concludes that the parties can agree on
the optimal bribe percentage [s'] because the creditors can count on the firm
to disclose that percentage accurately at the time of contracting. 38 Schwartz
assumes this accurate disclosure, 39 but does not explain why it occurs. The
reason is that in Schwartz's model, the firm captures the entire value of the
31. See id. at 1828 n.59 ("[Tihe firm can predict the private benefits that it later may realize
in bankruptcy ....").
32. Id. at 1824.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 1827 & n.58.
35. See id. at 1827-28. Schwartz does not explain the purpose of expressing the bribe as a
percentage rather than as an amount. Apparently he has assumed that the benefit and the
bankruptcy value of the firm may change, but that the relationship between them will not.
36. See id. at 1828 n.59. The argument I present here is an attack on the proof, not on
Schwartz's assumptions. Nevertheless, the assumption that the firm knows all of the information
necessary to fix the percentage of the bribe seems unrealistic. Firms borrowing money rarely
concern themselves with the difference in the amounts of the private benefits they could obtain by
later taking the corporation through an ill-advised reorganization rather than an optimal
liquidation [bR - bJ. Nor do they ordinarily have any reason to be familiar with bankruptcy
procedure, let alone to know the likely amount of the difference in the bankruptcy returns from an
ill-advised reorganization rather than an optimal liquidation [YL -YR-. If it is Schwartz's
assumption that every firm borrowing money would retain bankruptcy experts to conduct the
analysis necessary to determine these amounts, the costs would be enormous and the corrupting
influence on managers probably even more serious.
37. See id. ("[Tihe firm can predict the private benefits that it later may realize in
bankruptcy .... The creditors may not be able to observe the firm's private benefits ....").
38. See id. ("The firm will offer creditors a contract with a bribe of s" when this contract
would maximize the creditors' expected insolvency-state return.").
39. The firm is the only one assumed to have knowledge sufficient to calculate the optimal
bribe. See id. Yet the parties manage to contract for the optimal bribe. See id. This could occur
only if the firm disclosed its knowledge.
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firm and so wants a contract that will maximize that value.' Firm-value
maximization will occur only if the firm has the incentive at the time of
bankruptcy to file the optimal type of bankruptcy.
Schwartz's formula fixes the bribe so that it will be equal to the
marginal private benefit from choosing ill-advised reorganization [b, - b,]
under all conditions. The effect is to align the interests of the firm with
those of the creditors. To state it another way, the amount of the bribe
creates a good incentive to file liquidations that precisely equals and
therefore offsets the bad incentive the private benefits create to file
reorganizations. The effect is that the firm maximizes its share in the event
of bankruptcy-the bribe-by maximizing the base upon which it is
calculated-the monetary return [']. The firm will do that by choosing the
optimal form of bankruptcy.4'
II. STAGE TWO: CONTRACTING WHEN CREDITORS
LEND AT DIFFERENT TIMES
Recognizing that a model that assumed all creditors contracted with the
firm at the same time would be of "only theoretical interest,"4 Schwartz
extends his model to allow creditors to contract with the firm at different
times.43 At this second stage, the model contemplates two creditors who
contract with the firm sequentially at times t'and i , and assumes that the
"optimal bribe may vary over time." "
Schwartz's solution to this contracting problem is that (1) the firm and
the first creditor will fix the bribe percentage at its optimal value [s*] at their
time of contracting, and (2) to account for later changes in the percentage
of the optimal bribe [s'], the contract will provide two "'conversion terms'
40. The firm captures the entire value of the firm because the firm keeps the bribe and the
creditor loans the firm the full value of the firm less the bribe. To illustrate, when the bribe is
fixed at 0.33, Schwartz states the maximum expected return available for creditors in his example
to be:
E(R) =.8 x $260 + [0.67 X .2 X (.3 X S180+.7 X S120)] = 226.49.
d. at 1829 n.61. Under these assumptions, the value of the bribe would be:
[0.33 X .2 X (.3 X $180 +.7 x S120)) =S9.11.
The total of the creditors' expected return and the bribe is $226.49 + S9.11 = S235.60, see id., the
same value the finn would have if "' the firm always voluntarily chose the optimal bankruptcy
procedure without being bribed," id. at 1829.
41. See id at 1830.
42. Id. at 1833.
43. See id
44. Id. at 1834.
45. See id
1999]
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that will update the creditor's contract as later creditors arrive.""46
Schwartz's solution is incorrect because inclusion of these conversion terms
eliminates the firm's incentive to fix the bribe percentage optimally in the
contract with the first creditor.
The first conversion term provides that "if the bribe that the time '
parameters imply differs from the bribe that the t' parameters implied, the
bribe in the first contract will convert to the bribe in the second contract.
' 47
One purpose of this term is to make sure that all contracts provide for the
same bribe at the time of bankruptcy a.4  Though Schwartz never addresses
the point directly, he clearly intends that the terms of the initial creditor's
loan other than the percentage of the bribe be unaffected by conversion,
even though the creditor initially fixed them dependent on the amount of
the bribe, which conversion has changed.49
In the model's second stage, Schwartz incorrectly assumes that the firm
would present the initial creditor with a contract that fixed the bribe
percentage optimally at the time.5" The firm did present the creditors with
such a contract in the model's first stage, but only because the assumptions
of the first stage gave the firm incentives to do so.5"
The firm's incentives are materially different in the initial contract at
the model's second stage. The bankruptcy contract with the initial creditor
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. ("The conversion term also ensures that the firm's contracts will be consistent: As
of bankruptcy, all contracts will have the same bribe.").
49. Had Schwartz intended that conversion of the bribe result in adjustment of the other terms
of the initial creditor's contract, Schwartz would have had to consider how the adjustment would
be made. Were it necessary for the initial creditor and the firm to agree on terms appropriate to the
new bribe, Schwartz's solution would have lost the advantage it had over Rasmussen's. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text. If the adjustment were to be made in accordance with a formula
contained in the contract with the initial creditor. Schwartz would have had to describe the
formula and demonstrate its practicality. In either case, some mechanism would be needed to alert
the initial creditor that the bribe had been converted. Two passages in Schwartz's essay evidence
his intent that the other terms of the initial creditor's contract should not adjust for a later change
in the bribe. The first is Schwartz's acknowledgment that the firm could sometimes gain by
declining to fix the bribe optimally. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1835. If the terms of the
original contract adjusted, the firm would always do better by fixing the bribe optimally and
allowing the adjustment to occur. In the second, Schwartz explains why the initial creditor would
sign a contract that fixed the bribe based on conditions at to even though the creditor was aware
the conditions might change and the bribe with them. See id. at 1834. Schwartz's sophisticated
analysis that "[t]he first creditor would agree to a contract with this feature because the optimal
bribe for it will not vary in expectation, and also because the initial creditor always wants the firm
to make an optimal bankruptcy choice" and that "the best estimate of the value that s" will take at
t
2 , when bankruptcy-relevant variables are finally realized, is the value for s" when estimated as of
to,' id., would not have been necessary if the initial terms of lending adjusted to the new bribe.
The initial creditor would have been fully protected by the adjustment.
50. The assumption is implicit. Schwartz simply begins the section by assuming that such a
contract is available for the first creditor to sign. See Schwartz, supra note 3. at 1834 ("The initial
creditor has an incentive to sign this contract ....").
51. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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would not be the firm's last.12 Realizing that, the firm would also realize
that the bribe percentage fixed in the contract with the initial creditor would
never determine the bribe payable at bankruptcy. The bribe percentage
fixed in the initial contract would always convert to the bribe percentage
fixed in the second. Thus, the constraint that caused the firm to disclose
accurately in the model's first stage-fear that a suboptimal recovery would
result from the fixing of a suboptimal bribe-is absent from the process of
contracting with the initial creditor in the second stage.
Freed of that constraint, the firm's incentives in contracting with the
initial creditor would be to minimize the bribe percentage [s] in order to
maximize the amount that the creditors would expect to receive in the event
of insolvency and thereby borrow on the most favorable terms. Because the
firm has the information necessary to fix the optimal bribe,53 though the
creditors may not,' the firm could at least sometimes deceive the initial
creditor as to the optimal percentage. If the firm succeeded in its deception,
the firm would be able to borrow on more favorable terms."3 Having
borrowed on overly favorable terms that would not change,' the firm could
then consolidate its gains by entering into a contract with the second
creditor that fixed the bribe at the optimal percentage. 57
This malfunctioning of Schwartz's proposed bankruptcy contract does
not merely redistribute wealth. The initial creditor would realize that the
first conversion term gave the firm the incentive to misreport the optimal
percentage of the bribe to the initial creditor and the ability to profit at the
initial creditor's expense by so doing. For that reason, the initial creditor
would refuse to contract. Faced with this failure of contracting, the firm
would wish to make an honest disclosure, but the possibility of such
disclosure is inconsistent with Schwartz's assumption that the private
benefits are "unverifiable." 58 On Schwartz's assumptions, the correct
52. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1833 ("[L]et a firm have two creditors, with the first
arriving at to ...."). If Schwartz were to attempt to deprive the firm of the ability to borrow at t',
the model would no longer be capable of proving his theory that - [al set of contracts exists that
will achieve the results described... even though creditors lend at different times." lId
53. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1828 ("The lower the creditors* insolvency payoff.
the less they will lend ....").
56. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
57. 1 propose this optimal fixing of the bribe in this second contract only to make clear that
the firm achieves a net benefit by its deception at t: It optimizes the return from bankruptcy [yl
and the percentage of that return [s'] in addition to obtaining its lending on more favorable terms.
58. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1824 ("[P]rivate benefits are assumed to be
unverifiable."). Schwartz expressly states that "the parties cannot establish in court the monetary
value of these benefits" and that "lending agreements ... cannot ban or regulate private benefits
by contract." Id. This might seem to leave open the possibility that the firm could verify the
private benefits to creditors, with the result that deception would be impossible. This, however.
clearly was not Schwartz's intention. First, Schwartz himself assumes that deception is possible
under the model. See, e.g., id. at 1836 (" [T]he expected costs to the firm of offering later creditors
1999]
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conclusion is that no bankruptcy contracting will occur because the firm
cannot "make a credible commitment to choose optimally" between
reorganization and liquidation.59
Schwartz's second conversion term causes a malfunction of the
bankruptcy contract that is closely analogous to that caused by the first
conversion term. When the firm contracts with a second creditor, the
second term provides that "the initial creditor's contract will convert (only
as regards bankruptcy) to the contract type that is currently optimal for the
firm." ' Schwartz gives the example that " [i]f it becomes optimal for the
firm to offer the second creditor a renegotiation contract, the initial
creditor's contract will convert to a renegotiation contract as well." 6 Just as
the first conversion term left the firrn free to fix the bribe opportunistically
in the first contract and to correct it in the second, this second conversion
term leaves the firm free to fix the type of contract opportunistically in the
first contract and to correct it in the second. The firm would choose the type
of contract that appeared to give the first creditor the greatest expected
return, borrow on the resulting favorable terms, and consolidate its gains by
fixing the type of contract optimally in the firm's transaction with the
second creditor.62
III. STAGE THREE: CONTRACTING AMONG CREDITORS
WITH INCONSISTENT PREFERENCES
At the third stage, Schwartz seeks to expand his model to account for
the possibility that "a firm's creditors may have inconsistent preferences
concerning bankruptcy systems. 6 3 For example, some creditors might
prefer to pay a bribe for liquidation, while the other creditors might want to
attempt reorganization. The concern is that such conflicts might be
sufficient to prevent the parties from being able to agree to a single
bankruptcy contract. Schwartz analyzes two possible sources of such
conflict. The first is between junior and senior creditors; the second is
between trade creditors and ordinary creditors.
inefficient contracts apparently would often outweigh the gains."). Second, if creditors had means
of evaluating the firm's assertion that the bribe offered was optimal, the proof at stage one could
have been much simpler. In any event, an assumption that the optimal percentage of the bribe was
verifiable to one person (the creditor) but not to another (the judge) would be implausible.
59. Id. at 1826.
60. Id. at 1834.
61. Id.
62. Schwartz's use of the phrase "only as regards bankruptcy" makes clear with respect to
the second conversion term that terms of lending other than the type of contract do not change on
conversion. Id.
63. Id. at 1833.
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A. Conflict Between Junior and Senior Creditors
Schwartz acknowledges the conventional wisdom that senior creditors
generally favor liquidation while juniors favor reorganization. 6  But he
attributes this clash in preferences to the failure of the current bankruptcy
system to respect absolute priority. To continue the development of his
model into its third stage, Schwartz "assumes this conflict away by
supposing that systems R [reorganization] and L [liquidation] both pay
claims strictly in order of priority."' Schwartz concludes that this
assumption solves the problem of inconsistent preferences so that the firm's
optimal choice between reorganization and liquidation will also be optimal
for junior creditors. 66 To explain this preference, he offers the following
formula:
p = max (,- p, 0).
In ordinary language, junior creditors recover [p,] the higher of (1) the
bankruptcy return N] less the amount paid to senior creditors fp,], and (2)
zero. From his formula Schwartz concludes that "[t]herefore, the junior
creditor wants the firm to choose whichever system maximizes the
monetary return." 67
Schwartz errs, however, in assuming that deviations from the absolute
priority rule are the sole cause of the well-known conflict between senior
and junior creditors over the reorganization/liquidation choice. To see that
the conflict would remain even in a system that paid claims strictly in
accord with absolute priority, consider the following hypothetical.s At the
time it must choose between liquidation and reorganization [P], the firm
owes $100 to senior creditors and $200 to junior creditors. If the firm is
liquidated, the monetary return [y] will be $100. If the firm attempts
reorganization, there is a 40% chance of success, in which case the firm
will be worth $200, and a 60% chance of failure, in which case the firm will
64. See id. at 1836-37 (" [S]enior creditors today commonly prefer firms to use Chapter 7.
whether liquidation would be efficient or not, while junior creditors commonly prefer firms to use
Chapter 11, whether reorganization would be efficient or not.").
65. Id. at 1837. The apparent logic in making this assumption is Schwartz's further
assumption that an amendment to the bankruptcy law could mandate adherence to absolute
priority in reorganization cases. I accept both assumptions for purposes of this argument.
66. See id. ("If absolute priority is respected, junior creditors would prefer the firm to choose
the system that maximizes the monetary return, because they are paid nothing until claims senior
to theirs are paid in full.").
67. Id. at 1837 n.70.
68. This hypothetical is based loosely on the facts of In re Central Ice Cream Co.. 59 B.R.
476 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
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be worth nothing. Thus, the mean value of the expected return from
reorganization will be only $80.69
Because the expected return from liquidation ($100) exceeds the mean
value of the expected return from reorganization ($80), liquidation would
maximize social welfare. The junior creditors, however, will prefer
reorganization because they can expect a larger recovery [p,] in
reorganization than they would receive in liquidation. That is, in liquidation
the junior creditors would recover nothing; in reorganization they would
have a 40% chance of recovering $100-a mean bankruptcy return to
junior creditors of $40. This conflict persists even though distributions are
governed by the absolute priority rule.
Apparently understanding this, Schwartz acknowledges in a footnote
that his "analysis holds, though, only if the junior creditor focuses on the
mean bankruptcy return." 70 As Schwartz also realizes, however, the junior
creditor has no reason to focus on the mean bankruptcy return to all
creditors [y,]-the junior creditor is only interested in the mean bankruptcy
return to the junior creditor, which is the mean bankruptcy return to
creditors in excess of the senior creditor's payoff [y, - pJ. Schwartz
acknowledges this as well, when he admits that "[i]t can be shown that the
junior creditor would prefer a system with a lower mean return and a higher
variance if the junior creditor would expect to receive nothing even under
high realizations of the high mean procedure."71 In ordinary language, this
sentence means that junior creditors would prefer an ill-advised
reorganization in which they might get lucky (a "system with a lower mean
return and a higher variance") if the junior creditors would recover nothing
in a liquidation that produced greater overall value (" high realizations of
the high mean procedure"). Schwartz closes his discussion by pleading
ignorance as to how often this conflict would manifest itself in practice.72 In
so doing, he ignores a substantial literature dealing with the conflict," a
69. This is calculated as follows: (.4 X $200) + (.6 X $0) = $80.
70. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1837 n.70.
71. Id.
72. See id. ("It is unclear how common this preference would be in practice.").
73. The seminal work is part of a book by Fama and Miller. See EUGEN, F. FAMA &
MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 178-81 (1972) (noting the conflict between
creditors and shareholders regarding investment policy). Much of the literature deals with
conflicts between creditors and shareholders rather than creditors inter se. See, e.g., Jeremy I.
Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELL J. ECON. 437, 439-40 (1978):
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior. Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334-37 (1976). But when a company is
insolvent, the junior creditors occupy the position of shareholders and the same principles apply.
See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439. 443 (1992) ("On
the eve of an insolvent debtor's bankruptcy, junior claimants have little to lose and much to gain if
they invest the debtor's assets in a risky venture. Thus the junior claimants have an incentive to
take untoward risks with the troubled firm's assets. Senior claimants, in contrast, bear the risk that
such an investment will fail and do not share the junior claimant's incentives.")" Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
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consensus among judges and practitioners that the conflict is inherent and
pervasive in the choice between reorganization and liquidation, 4 and a vast
body of empirical evidence suggesting that junior creditors generally
recover nothing in liquidation." The case in which Schwartz's proposed
solution fails is not some rarity; it is the norm.
The consequence of this failure for Schwartz's model is that neither a
junior nor a senior76 creditor could be counted on to seek maximization of
the value of the firm at the time of bankruptcy contracting. Bankruptcy
contracts would tend to fix the bribe either too high or too low, depending
upon whether the particular contract was with a junior creditor or a senior
creditor.
The Coase Theorem tells us that in a world of perfect markets and zero
transaction costs, the conflict between junior and senior creditors would be
resolved by a contract between them that maximized the value of the estate
and divided the increase in value thus attained between them in such a
manner that each would be better off.7 Here the contract would be one
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 683-84 (1993) (illustrating the conflict
between "senior" and "junior" interests in a similar example. without respect to whether the
juniors are creditors or shareholders).
74. See, e.g., In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305. 1317 (5th Cir. 1993) ("While secured
creditors might generally prefer liquidation and unsecured creditors might generally support
reorganization, the Code surely does not require them to take such positions."): In re Seaescape
Cruises, 131 B.R. 241,242 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) ("The Debtor argues that the several members
of the Committee who hold maritime liens are secured creditors who do not fairly represent the
interests of unsecured creditors; that a conflict of interests exists within the Committee, since the
maritime lien claimants would necessarily consider it in their own best interest to resist the
Debtor's efforts to reorganize because they will more likely fare better from the liquidation of the
Debtor."); In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, 65 B.R. 918, 921 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (" ITihis case
does not present the usual conflict between the interests of the debtor and those of secured and
unsecured claimholders. Here the secured claimholders. Leon and Gloria Baker and their related
entities, control the debtor and seek to continue a joint effort to effect a reorganization."); In re
Sweetwater, 40 B.R. 733, 737 n.10 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (quoting expert testimony that 'It]he
fundamental conflict in all of this area is the struggle between secured creditors and the debtor or
unsecured creditors because they usually side with the debtor on this question, as to how long he
is going to be given to try to rehabilitate, reorganize and how quickly are you going to allow the
secured creditor to realize on its collateral" (alteration in original)).
75. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFicE. BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION: CASE
RECEIPTS PAID TO CREDITORS AND PROFESSIONALS 1. 5 (1994) (showing unsecured creditors as
recovering nothing in 42% of asset-case Chapter 7 bankruptcies, which amounts to 97% of all
liquidating bankruptcies); Robert M. Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris. Professional Fees and Other
Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Business Liquidations, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1207, 1218 (1997) ("In the
vast majority of our chapter 7 business cases, the bankrupt firms had nothing left over after paying
the costs of administering the case and distributing collateral to secured creditors."); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systenis Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. LJ. 247, 255 (1983) (" Debtors' disclosure statements in the [Chapter 1 I
cases studied almost invariably asserted that the unsecured creditors should accept the debtor's
proposal to continue operation because they would receive nothing in liquidation.").
76. Though I have analyzed only the interests of junior creditors, a similar analysis of the
incentives of senior creditors would show that they have an inherent bias in favor of liquidation.
77. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Praginatisin Regained: The Ironic History of the
Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 401 (1997) ("According to the Coase Theorem, assuming
that transaction costs don't prevent contracting around legal rules, the legal rules don't matter-or
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between junior and senior creditors in which earlier creditors bribed the
most recently arrived creditor to fix an optimal bribe for the firm. The
problem Schwartz set out to solve, however, was how the parties could
arrive at an optimal bankruptcy contract, not in a world of perfect markets
and zero transaction costs, but in the world of his assumptions. In that
world, creditors arrive at different times and have no means of bribing one
another because they never negotiate with one another.
B. Conflict Between Trade and Ordinary Creditors
The second source of conflict among creditors that Schwartz considers
is that trade creditors, who profit by selling additional merchandise to the
debtor during a reorganization effort, have an ulterior motive that might
cause them to favor "wasteful reorganization."78 Because profits from the
additional sales would distort their incentives in favor of continuing the
business, these creditors "would be unwilling to bribe the firm to choose
system L when L turned out to be optimal for creditors as a group.""
Schwartz's solution to the problem is to permit "majority rule... to govern
the contracting process." 80 Schwartz's reference to the "ex ante majority" 8
makes clear that the majority is to be determined by elections in bankruptcy
contracts, not in a vote taken after the bankruptcy case is filed.
Schwartz's solution to the trade-creditor problem has three serious
defects, any one of which would render it unworkable. First, it is
inconsistent with his solution in the second stage to the problem of creditors
lending at different times. Recall that when the initial creditor contracted
with the firm at time t', and a second creditor contracted with the firm at
time t', Schwartz proposed that the bribe in the first creditor's contract
would convert to the bribe in the second creditor's contract.8 2 Schwartz now
apparently proposes that the same issue is to be resolved by majority vote
instead. He cannot have it both ways if his solution is to operate in the real
world.
Second, Schwartz gives no clue as to how he would count the votes.
Assume, for example, that the firm's three creditors contracted to fix the
bribe percentage [s] at 30%, 35%, and 40%, respectively. One might count
more precisely, the parties will always bargain their way to an economically efficient outcome,
regardless of the legal rule."); Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to
Professors Bradley and Rosenzveig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79, 106 (1992) (stating the theorem as
follows: "In the absence of transaction costs, parties will reach an agreement that maximizes joint
wealth.").




82. See id. at 1834.
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this as a mere failure of the voting process because no proposed bribe
percentage [s] received a majority vote. Alternatively, one might average
the three votes to fix the bribe percentage [s] at 35% or take the median to
reach the same result. Considering Schwartz's assumption that "which
contract would be optimal can be time variant," '' if the three creditors
contracted with the debtor at different times the most reasonable
supposition might be that the optimal amount of the bribe increased with
the passage of time and is now 40%. But that supposition leads to the
conclusion that voting can be an appropriate solution only if all creditors
vote at the same time. Schwartz offers no mechanism by which the
creditors, who he assumes arrive at different times, could do that.
Third, Schwartz's proposal of majority rule implicitly assumes that the
creditors who prefer an efficient liquidation will outnumber those who
prefer an inefficient reorganization. Probably in most cases, the reverse will
be true: The firm will have a single "objective" bank lender and a large
number of trade creditors who are biased in favor of reorganization. Even if
the voting is by dollar amount of claims, the trade creditors will hold a
blocking position in many cases.' The current system works because it
does not rely on voting to make the choice between reorganization and
liquidation. Instead, it employs a procedure that is anathema to Schwartz:s
having a bankruptcy judge determine whether the value of the company is
higher in reorganization or liquidation. 6
In the third stage of his model, Schwartz deliberately ignores the
conflict between contract creditors, who have the opportunity to contract
with the debtor, and involuntary creditors, who do not.r8 As to the specific
issue Schwartz models-the choice between reorganization and
83. Id. at 1833.
84. Chapter 11 voting procedures, which Schwartz apparently would adopt by reference.
require more than two-thirds of the creditors in a class to vote in favor before the class is
considered to have accepted. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994). The purpose of this requirement is
to prevent a simple majority from imposing its plan on an opposing minority that is essentially as
large. Schwartz does not indicate whether he would abandon this longstanding rule.
85. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 3. at 1818 ("Local communities know more than
bankruptcy judges can know about the public benefits of saving particular firms. Therefore local
communities will make more accurate continuation decisions than bankruptcy courts will.").
86. Under the "best interests of creditors" test in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). the court can
confirm a plan of reorganization only if the court concludes that every creditor will receive under
the plan at least as much value as it would receive in liquidation. Logically, the court can make
such a finding only if the court finds that reorganization will produce at least as much value as
liquidation.
87. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1810 n.15 ("Tort and environmental victims of the firm's
activities do not bargain with the firm ex ante, but do have current bankruptcy claims against it.
These claims should be protected in bankruptcy, but just how is beyond this Essay's scope."). In
an earlier article, Schwartz indicated a belief that conflicts between tort and contract creditors are
unimportant because nearly all tort liability is covered by insurance. See Alan Schwartz. A Theory
of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 259 (1989). That belief is unfounded. See. e.g., Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1906 n.81 (1994)
(providing examples of large firms having uninsured tort liability in excess of their ability to pay).
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liquidation-at least two sources of conflict are apparent. First, involuntary
creditors whose claims have not yet been reduced to judgment may tend to
prefer reorganization so that they can litigate the amounts of their claims
against the representatives of "guilty," subordinate shareholders rather than
against the "innocent" holders of other unsecured claims.8" Second, future
involuntary creditors-those who will be injured after bankruptcy by
wrongful acts the debtor committed before bankruptcy-might tend to fare
better if the business were preserved as a going concern that remained liable
for future claims, while voluntary creditors might tend to prefer an
immediate liquidation that estimated the future claims and reserved some of
the proceeds to pay for them or that liquidated the firm and distributed the
proceeds before involuntary creditors suffered their injuries and sued. 9
These conflicts are of sufficient importance and complexity that
bankruptcy courts have appointed representatives ex post to protect the
interests of future claim holders. 9' If present creditors could make the
critical decisions regarding bankruptcy procedure in ex ante contracts, they
could freeze future claimants out of the decisionmaking process altogether.
Appointing future claims representatives ex ante to participate in the
bankruptcy contracting is not a possible solution for three reasons. First, no
institutional mechanism exists for identifying the situations in which such
appointments would be necessary or for making them. Second,
appointments would have to be made for all firms that might have future
claims liability, including firms not in financial difficulty. Finally, even if
that expense were warranted, the representatives appointed could not
exercise the power that balances and legitimates ex ante bankruptcy
contracting: the power to refuse to extend credit.
When proposals for bankruptcy contracting extend beyond the
reorganization/liquidation decision Schwartz explores in his model, the
conflicts between voluntary and involuntary creditors multiply.9
88. That is, the finder of fact is likely to be more generous with a tort creditor whose recovery
will come from the debtor in reorganization than with a tort creditor whose recovery will come
from the distributions that otherwise would go to other creditors. For a reflection of this prejudice
in current bankruptcy law, see I1 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4), which subordinates claims for exemplary
and punitive damages to the claims of unsecured creditors generally, but only in Chapter 7
liquidations.
89. Indeed, asset-securitization transactions, discussed in the next Part, can be viewed as pre-
insolvency liquidations that contract creditors demand in part to assure their priority over later-
accruing involuntary claims. The securitization contract assures that the business can continue
despite the liquidation of its assets.
90. See, e.g., Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie Andra Gavrin, Constitutional Limitations on the
Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 745, 757 n.46 (1993) (listing cases in
which bankruptcy courts have appointed future claimants' representatives).
91. Other scholars who have addressed the conflict between tort and contract creditors have
generally proposed to resolve the conflict by subordinating contract creditors, including secured
creditors, to tort creditors. See LoPucki, supra note 87, at 1908 n.88 (citing endorsements of tort-
creditor priority by Professors Barry Adler, David Leebron, Robert Rasmussen, and Mark Roe).
Despite the endorsement of such well-respected scholars, lawmakers are unlikely to subordinate
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Ultimately, these conflicts may be impossible to resolve in any scheme of
bankruptcy contracting. Until that is determined, scholars should consider
bankruptcy-contract "solutions" that do not address the conflicts between
voluntary and involuntary creditors to be partial or, better yet, incomplete.
IV. DOES BANKRUPTCY CONTRACTING SEEK EFFICIENCY
OR MERELY REDISTRIBUTION?
Schwartz posits at the outset that the kinds of bankruptcy contracts he
discusses are currently illegal.92 This premise serves two functions in his
argument. First, it suggests that the stakes are large: If Schwartz could
prove bankruptcy contracting efficient, the proof would establish the need
for a change in current law.93 Second, his premise excuses him from the
need to present empirical evidence of a demand for the right to contract for
bankruptcy procedure. If bankruptcy contracts are illegal, no such evidence
could exist.94
Schwartz's premise is wrong in two respects. First, although courts
have refused to enforce some kinds of bankruptcy contracts as violative of
"public policy," their statements are generally dicta; the issue has rarely
been addressed in binding precedent.95 At least one commentator believes
that bankruptcy contracts are not currently illegal; that is, he believes that
the courts would enforce appropriate bankruptcy contracts presented to
them.96
secured creditors to tort creditors, making the prospects for an efficient scheme of bankruptcy
contracting similarly remote. See. e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney. Jr.. Measuring the
Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1349, 1371 (1997) ("As a political matter, the subordination
proposals have no realistic prospects for widespread support and adoption.").
92. "[P]arties cannot contract in lending agreements to use a bankruptcy system other than
the one the state supplies." Schwartz, supra note 3. at 1808. "Finns today cannot finance projects
that they would be able to finance if the ban were repealed." Id. at 1832.
93. See id. at 1812 (claiming as part of his essay's contribution "a demonstration that parties
could solve their coordination problem at the credit extension stage and so would write efficient
'bankruptcy contracts' if they were free to do so").
94. See id at 1833 ("Because bankruptcy contracts are currently illegal, there is no data
about real contracts that could support this argument.").
95. See Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Banknrptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory. Practice,
and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 301, 306 (1997) ("Although numerous courts have commented in
dicta on the unenforceability of a firm's waiver of the right to file bankruptcy, few cases actually
raise the issue and none analyze it."). No precedent regarding prepetition bankruptcy waivers by
corporations appears to exist above the district court level. See id. at 305-09.
96. See id at 349 ("The Code does not prohibit a firm from waiving its right or restricting its
ability to file a voluntary petition, or from waiving the automatic stay."); id. at 305-09 (arguing
that none of the cases on which the courts relied addresses the enforceability of a contractual
waiver of bankruptcy rights or explains how bankruptcy waivers violate bankruptcy policy): id. at
303 ("This Article challenges the accepted view that bankruptcy waivers are unenforceable under
the Bankruptcy Code."); see also Schwarcz, supra note 2. at 600 (" I have shown that when a
debtor and all of its creditors agree to a procedure contract, there is little question that the contract
should be enforced."). But see Tracht. supra note 95, at 305 (" Although there is little case law on
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
Second, legal strategies are often capable of achieving results that
appear impossible on the face of legal doctrine.97 This has already occurred
to some degree with respect to bankruptcy contracting.98 As Professor
Marshall Tracht observes, aggressive lawyers have devised a wide variety
of strategies to enable willing debtors and their creditors to opt out of the
state-supplied bankruptcy system.99 The following list illustrates the broad
range and power of these strategies:
1. Locking control. A corporate debtor can file bankruptcy only if its
board of directors authorizes it to do so."re Creditors prevent the necessary
authorization by contracting ex ante for a provision in the debtor's
corporate charter that requires the affirmative vote of all directors to
authorize a bankruptcy filing or to authorize a change in the charter
provision. The charter provision distributes voting power in the corporation
such that at least one of the directors elected will not vote in favor of a
bankruptcy filing not approved by creditors. 1 For example, the charter
might allow creditors to appoint a director;"0 2 it might authorize a voting
proxy in favor of one or more creditors;"' or it might require the
appointment of a director with fiduciary duties to creditors."°
2. Voting debt. The bankruptcy contract provides that upon specified
events of default, creditors have the option to convert a portion of their debt
this question, courts seem to accept, almost as a matter of faith, that commercial agreements
waiving the right to file for bankruptcy are unenforceable.").
97. See Tracht, supra note 95, at 302 ("Thus, we have created a situation in which both
theory and practice are increasingly at odds with the established view of the law-a conflict which
has gone largely unaddressed in the legal literature."); Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyranch.
A Theory of Legal Strategy (Aug. 20, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law
Journal) (arguing that conventional legal theory misleads by ignoring the ability of legal strategy
to transform legal doctrine).
98. See Tracht, supra note 95, at 302 (" [C]orporate and bankruptcy lawyers have become
increasingly adept at designing techniques that keep firms from utilizing the bankruptcy laws
without running afoul of the law's hostility to [bankruptcy] waivers.").
99. See id. at 309-11 (describing strategies for bankruptcy-proofing); see also LYNN M.
LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 186-87 (3d ed. 1997)
(describing strategies for "bankruptcy-proofing the debtor corporation" ).
100. See, e.g., In re Runaway II, Inc., 159 B.R. 537, 537-38 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993)
(dismissing a corporate bankruptcy petition because the filing was not authorized by its board of
directors); In re Giggles Restaurant, 103 B.R. 549, 553 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) ("[lit is clear that
any corporate resolution which authorizes the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition must
originate at a validly held meeting of directors and must be approved by the proper number of
such directors.").
101. See, e.g., LOPUcKI, supra note 99, at 186; Christopher T. Katucki, Make Your Ne.t
Workout Bankruptcy Remote, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Nov. 19, 1996. at 3 (suggesting that the
debtor's charter be amended to require the affirmative vote of all directors for a bankruptcy
filing).
102. See, e.g., In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 716-17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating that charters made debtors "bankruptcy proof' by prohibiting debtors from seeking
bankruptcy without the unanimous consent of the board of directors, including an "independent"
director whose fees were paid by the mortgage holder).
103. See Tracht, supra note 95, at 309.
104. See infra text accompanying note 120.
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into shares of stock that have voting control of the debtor corporation. 5
The creditors, as controlling shareholders, then decline to file bankruptcy or
dismiss a bankruptcy already filed. In a variation of this technique, the
creditors take a security interest in the controlling stock of a debtor
corporation to secure the corporation's obligations. In the event of default,
the creditors foreclose on the stock to take control of the debtor
corporation. 6
3. Leverage through personal guarantees. The bankruptcy contract
provides for personal guarantees by the owners of the debtor firm that, by
their terms, operate only in the event that the corporation files bankruptcy
without the consent of the creditors." 7 Such an executory contract is not an
ipso facto provision unenforceable under § 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code because it is not an executory contract of the debtor (corporation). t"5
Making the guarantees in the form of standby letters of credit can virtually
eliminate any doubts as to the enforceability of such "springing" or
"exploding" guarantees."' 9
4. Isolation of collateral. The bankruptcy contract provides that the
collateral will be held by an entity separate from that conducting the main
operations of the debtor so that the stay will not bar foreclosure if the main
entity goes into bankruptcy." 0 The isolated entity can also be bankruptcy-
proofed, using one of the other methods."'
5. Bankruptcy-ineligible entities. Trusts that are not business trusts are
ineligible to file for bankruptcy. Placing assets in such a trust prevents the
assets from falling into bankruptcy." 2
Each of these devices meets Schwartz's criteria for bankruptcy
contracting: They can be part of the initial lending agreement; they can be
employed on behalf of the debtor and creditors as a group; and they can
prevent the debtor from filing bankruptcy without the consent of the
creditors. Creditors who can prevent bankruptcy entirely can, of course,
105. See LOPUCKI, supra note 99, at 186.
106. See, e.g., In re Advanced Ribbons and Office Prods.. 125 B.R. 259. 260 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1991) (awarding creditors possession and control of debtor corporation through a postpetition
foreclosure against stock of the debtor corporation); A.D.M. Corp. v. Thomson. 707 F.2d 25, 28
(1st Cir. 1983) (upholding a secured creditor's purchase of controlling stock in the debtor at the
secured creditor's own foreclosure sale over objections based on federal securities laws).
107. See LOPuCKI, supra note 99, at 187.
108. See id.
109. See Tracht, supra note 95, at 313-14.
110. See LOPUCKI, supra note 99, at 186-87.
111. See, e.g., In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(involving real estate collateral separated among numerous corporations, each bankruptcy-proofed
by means of a control provision).
112. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 434, 468 (1998) (noting the frequent use of trusts to
achieve bankruptcy remoteness in asset-securitization transactions); Tracht. supra note 95. at 309.
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condition bankruptcy. That opens the door for some kinds of bankruptcy
contracting."13
It is difficult to estimate how often creditors employ these strategies to
contract for bankruptcy procedure. When employed successfully, the result
is usually that the debtor remains outside bankruptcy; no court has occasion
to write an opinion; and the existence of the contract remains known only to
the parties." 4 Only the clumsiest" 5 and most egregious.. 6 are challenged in
court and risk exposure in published opinions.
Repeat participants, however, have sometimes indicated the broader
patterns of bankruptcy contracting. These indications suggest two areas in
which bankruptcy contracting is widespread. First, waivers of the automatic
stay are now routinely inserted into workout agreements, particularly those
dealing with single-asset real estate." 7 Second, strategic "bankruptcy
proofing" devices appear to be in widespread use in the booming asset-
securitization market."18
In an article that described the $200 million securitization of some of
Sea Containers, Ltd.'s marine cargo containers, James Gadsden-whose
firm, Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, represented Sea Containers, Ltd. at the
113. Once creditors permit their debtor to file in the state-supplied bankruptcy system, no
contractual restriction reliably can prevent that debtor from using the entire range of options
available to debtors in that system. A court can declare any restriction void as in violation of the
public policy barring bankruptcy contracts. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (granting Chapter 7
debtors the right to convert their cases to Chapter II and specifically providing that waiver of the
right is unenforceable).
114. See Tracht, supra note 95, at 314 ("If disincentives succeed in their objective, they leave
little or no trace in the law records. Debtors who 'go gentle into that good night' rather than file
for bankruptcy do not show up in the case books or bankruptcy statistics."). Secrecy may provide
an important reason for society to reject contract solutions. The problems with regulation occur
publicly and are therefore subject to examination and correction through the political process. The
problems with contract occur privately and can be examined only to the extent that contracting
parties volunteer information or the state requires disclosure. The latter is unlikely to occur unless
some question is first raised regarding the particular type of contracting.
115. See, e.g., Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. at 713 (involving a mortgage holder who
selected and paid the fees of an "independent" director who had authority, under a provision in
the charter, to veto a bankruptcy filing). The device was exposed in court only because the debtor
managed to get into bankruptcy by soliciting unsecured creditors to file an involuntary petition
against it. See id. at 737 ("The Debtors and the Petitioning Creditors orchestrated the filing of
these involuntary cases to evade what they perceived to be an insurmountable restriction against
the Debtors' filing voluntary petitions.").
116. See cases cited infra note 128.
117. See, e.g., Daniel B. Bogart, Games Lawyers Play: Waivers of the Automatic Stay in
Bankruptcy and the Single Asset Loan Workout, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1117, 1134, 1226-27 (1996)
(describing the spread of stay waivers based on interviews and examination of the practitioner
literature); Jeffrey W. Warren & Wendy V.E. England, Pre-Petition Waiver of the Automatic Stay
Is Not Per Se Enforceable, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 1994, available in LEXIS, Lawrev
Library, ABU File, at *1 ("Practically every loan modification or business workout agreement
drafted today contains a series of boilerplate 'bankruptcy waiver' provisions.").
118. James Gadsden, What the Credit Analyst Should Know About Securitization, BUS.
CREDIT, Mar. 1998, at 54, 56.
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time"--also described the steps generally taken to assure that a
corporation established to own securitized assets (the "Special Purpose
Vehicle," or the "SPV") could not enter the state-supplied bankruptcy
system. They are:
seeking agreements from all parties that deal with the SPV,
including the parties to the securitization financing, that they will
not initiate a bankruptcy case against the SPV, [and] requiring the
appointment to the board of directors of an independent director
charged with fiduciary duties to the creditors. The independent
director's consent is required to initiate a bankruptcy case and is
expected to be withheld if the only benefit of the bankruptcy filing
is to assist the [corporation that originated the transaction].'"
The concern addressed in the last sentence of this provision is that the
assets of the SPV might be drawn into the bankruptcy of the originator.
Commentators all agree that the "bankruptcy remoteness" of the SPV is
essential to the securitization transaction.' 2' They dispute, however, what
the parties gain by keeping the assets of the SPV out of the originator's
bankruptcy. Some argue, consistent with Schwartz's losition, that the
purpose is merely to avoid the inefficiency of bankruptcy.'" One effect of
asset securitization, however, is to shift the risks of the originator's business
away from investors and to impose them on involuntary or non-adjusting
creditors such as taxing authorities, employees, and creditors injured by the
debtor's business practices.'2 By spinning off a portion of its assets in the
SPV, the debtor reduces the total assets exposed to the risks of its business
and the claims of its future, non-adjusting creditors. 4 The benefits to
originators and investors may, in at least some asset securitizations, derive
entirely from that risk shifting.
119. See SEA CoNTAINERs, LTD., FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECE.IBER 31. 1997.
pt. III, item 13, para. 3 (1998).
120. Gadsden, supra note 118, at 56; cf Tracht. supra note 95, at 310-11 (discussing
securitization and concluding that bankruptcy-proofing of "special purpose vehicles" has "been
largely but not entirely successful").
121. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchenmy of Asset Securitization. I STAN. J.L Bus. &
FIN. 133, 135 (1994) ("The SPV, however, must be structured as 'bankruptcy remote' to gain
acceptance as an issuer of capital market securities.").
122. See, e.g., Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72
TuL. L. REv. 101, 129 (1997) ("If the bankruptcy process is an inefficient means of making the
asset deployment and distributional decisions raised by financial distress, asset securitization may
be a means by which all investors could make a binding promise to avoid the process (at least
with respect to the securitized assets).").
123. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE Li. 1. 23-30 (1996)
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Schwartz excludes prepetition waivers of the automatic stay from his
concept of bankruptcy contracting, apparently because the contracting
occurs after insolvency rather than at the time of the lending agreement. 2 '
While this exclusion may be warranted by the nature of Schwartz's
proposal,'26 it prevents him from noticing a pattern in the stay-waiver cases
that has ominous implications for bankruptcy contracting.
In nearly all cases, the stay-waiver contracts are merely between the
debtor and a single, dominant secured creditor.'27 The agreement of the
unsecured creditors is never solicited. 2 s Courts that reject these devices
give a variety of reasons, but the most common is to avoid prejudice to non-
signing unsecured creditors.' 29 That secured creditors do not obtain the
agreement of unsecured creditors in so many of these cases suggests that
the goal of this contracting is not efficiency, but merely redistribution of
wealth from unsecured to secured creditors.'30 That is, the stay waiver is a
125. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1840 ("[T]he firm cannot waive its right to stay
collection in the lending agreement.").
126. Schwartz's solution to the problem of contracting-that the debtor disclose the amount
of the optimal bribe [s'] and the parties contract for it because it is in both their interests-only
works at the time of the initial loan. By contrast, stay waivers are generally used only after
insolvency; waivers given at the time of the loan are generally thought to be unenforceable. See.
e.g., Tracht, supra note 95, at 345 (referring to the "practitioners' belief that initial waivers are
not enforceable, but that waivers may be enforceable as part of an out-of-court workout").
127. But see In re Tru Block Concrete Prods., 27 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (refusing
to enforce a prepetition agreement not to file bankruptcy even though substantially all creditors
had signed). Asset securitizations follow Rasmussen's model more closely than Schwartz's model
in that the relevant provisions are placed in the charter of the SPV. However, no renegotiation
over time is contemplated, and the originator's creditors-those disadvantaged by the
transaction-need not be advised or consulted.
128. See, e.g., In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 434 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (refusing to enforce a
prepetition agreement between the debtor and a single creditor and noting that such enforcement
"would permit a single creditor to opt out of the collective process mandated by the Bankruptcy
Code to the potential detriment of the debtor and other creditors"); In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686,
690 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting, in refusing to enforce a prepetition agreement between the
debtor and a single mortgage lender, that the debtor would not refile bankruptcy for 180 days and
that "[s]uch a temporary bar could harm competing creditors, as it could provide one creditor with
an unfair advantage, such as providing that creditor with sufficient time as to avoid the [statutoryl
preference period"); In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (enforcing a prepetition
agreement with only a single creditor, but only because no other creditor objected); Farm Credit v.
Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (noting that "[n]o other creditors were involved in the
prepetition agreement" and refusing to lift the stay); In re Sky Group Int'l, 108 B.R. 86, 89
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (refusing to lift the automatic stay in accordance with a prepetition
agreement because none of the creditors who brought the involuntary petition was a party to the
agreement); In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, 12 B.R. 989 (Bank. N.D. Ga. 1980) (refusing to
enforce a covenant against bankruptcy filing made with only a single creditor).
129. See cases cited supra note 128. Absent prejudice to other creditors, the courts tend to
enforce prepetition waivers. See, e.g., In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 309 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1991) (holding a prepetition agreement enforceable in a case in which the debtor had "only a few
unsecured creditors whose claims [were] de minimus"). But see In re Atrium High Point Ltd., 189
B.R. 599, 608 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995) (refusing to enforce a prepetition waiver actually agreed to
by eight of the nine objecting creditors).
130. Stay waivers are the types of bankruptcy contracts for which it would be least expensive
to seek the consent of all creditors. Secured creditors can obtain stay waivers during workouts, the
point at which unsecured creditors can most easily be identified and solicited.
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means by which the secured creditor and debtor capture wealth that
otherwise would go to unsecured creditors.
The current pattern of bankruptcy contracting may be motivated to
some degree by considerations of efficiency. Yet these examples show that
both types of bankruptcy contracting currently in wide use-asset
securitizations and stay waivers-have the potential to redistribute wealth
from noncontracting parties to contracting parties. By contrast, no evidence
exists of any form of contracting that would protect all creditors, present
and future-even though such contracts would have far greater appeal to
the courts.' 3' This pattern suggests that the latter types of contracts may not
offer sufficient benefits to justify the costs of making them.
Of course, the direction of bankruptcy contracting might change with
de jure legalization. The costs of contracting might be lower and the results
more certain. In such a world, the parties might choose different contracts
than they do today. But the little evidence currently available suggests that
the real-world appeal of bankruptcy contracts lies less in their capacity to
maximize social welfare than in their capacity to redistribute wealth.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on his assumptions in the first stage of his model, Alan Schwartz
proves bankruptcy contracting to be feasible in an environment in which all
creditors contract with the firm simultaneously and all have identical rights.
His solution is a contract that offers the debtor a bribe to file for liquidation
that equals and offsets the private benefit the firm would gain by filing for
reorganization.'32
In the second stage of his model, Schwartz attempts to expand his
solution to an environment in which creditors have identical interests, but
contract at different times. His solution at this stage is a contract that fixes
the bribe payable at bankruptcy according to the provisions of the firm's
last contract with a creditor.'33 That solution, however, would be
unacceptable to an extender of credit unless that extender knew it would be
the last. The debtor would have insufficient incentives to disclose to earlier
extenders the information they would need to fix the bribe optimally."'
Contracting would fail, leaving Schwartz's entire model of "only
theoretical interest." '35
131. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 600 ("Indeed, I have been unable to find any
evidence of the existence of actual procedure contracts.").
132. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
134. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
135. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1833.
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Although the third stage of Schwartz's model is rendered moot by the
failure of the second, his contracting solution at the third stage fails as well.
In that stage, Schwartz attempts to expand his solution to an environment in
which some creditors have priority over others and in which trade creditors
have ulterior motives for favoring even ill-advised reorganization. As for
the conflict between junior and senior creditors, Schwartz incorrectly
assumes that amending the Bankruptcy Code to assure the seniors of
absolute priority over the juniors in reorganization cases would eliminate
it.136 As for the conflict between trade and other creditors, Schwartz
proposes a contracting solution-majority rule-that conflicts with his
solution to the contracting problem at stage two-the last contract
governs. 37 His solution also suffers from his failure to specify the nature of
the majority required'38 and his dubious assumption that trade creditors with
ulterior motives would not be in the majority. 139
Schwartz's failure to deliver a model of bankruptcy contracting that
works does not mean that such a model is impossible. The purpose of
Schwartz's model was to improve on Rasmussen's impractical, but
admittedly workable, solution by lowering transaction costs.14 Although
the first stage of Schwartz's model generates a contract that is optimal on
the model's assumptions, this Essay demonstrates that the elegant
mechanism by which it does so cannot operate in a world in which creditors
lend at different times or under different circumstances. To improve on
Rasmussen's solution will require an entirely new mechanism. Until that
occurs, the theoretical case for welfare-maximizing contractual bankruptcy
remains unproven.1
41
Practitioners report extensive contracting for bankruptcy procedure in
two kinds of transactions: workouts and assets securitizations. Failure of
secured creditors to include unsecured creditors in the contracts for stay
waivers in workouts suggests that the contracting parties are attempting to
appropriate the expectancies of the unsecured creditors rather than to
maximize social welfare. 4 Failure to protect the future creditors of the
136. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
138. See supra text accompanying note 83.
139. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
140. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1811 (" [This solution] may founder over the problem that
because the optimality of a bankruptcy system is state-dependent, it also can be time-dependent.
Put more simply, time may render a company's charter solution outmoded, and corporate charters
are inconvenient to amend."). Had Schwartz's model worked, no creditor would have had to
concern itself with the contracting activity of any other-what Schwartz referred to as "the
relative flexibility of using lending agreements to induce the choice of optimal bankruptcy
systems." Id.
141. Based on other defects in proof, and without discussing the defect in proof described in
this reply, Susan Block-Lieb had already reached the conclusion that the case for contract
bankruptcy remains unproven by any scholar. See Block-Lieb, supra note 2. at 9-28.
142. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
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originator in asset-securitization contracts suggests that redistribution of
wealth may be the motivating force in those transactions as well.' These
tendencies of real-world bankruptcy contracting to seize on opportunities
for redistribution do not bode well for the future of bankruptcy contracting.
The case for freedom of contract rests squarely on the assumption that
each party chooses the contract because the contract makes that party better
off. Because each party is better off, all parties are better off in the
aggregate.'" That aggregate then becomes a proxy for "social welfare." In
the bankruptcy context, this theory holds that thousands of correct decisions
by a debtor and each of its creditors and shareholders will generate one
correct decision-the bankruptcy contract-in the aggregate. 4  That
decision will maximize social welfare.
The principal problem in attempting to apply this theory in the context
of bankruptcy is that most creditors' interests are too small to warrant their
active, knowledgeable participation. The task of bankruptcy-contract
promoters is to find justifications for treating these creditors as if they had
participated knowledgeably.'" Thus, Alan Schwartz would bind every
earlier creditor to the contract made by the last, on the theory that the earlier
one would have made the same decision; 47 Steven Schwarcz would bind
creditors to bankruptcy-procedure contracts on the basis of actual
agreement by "representative members of a similarly situated class," on the
theory that "distributional effects on other members of the class are likely
to be small";'" and Marshall Tracht would bind unsecured creditors to the
stay waivers contracted by debtors with their secured creditors on the
theory that the recoveries of unsecured creditors would have been de
minimis anyway.'49 Only Robert Rasmussen seems to contemplate
requiring the agreement of all creditors for the validity of a bankruptcy
143. See supra text accompanying notes 123-124.
144. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark. Contracts. Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate
Law, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 1703, 1714 (1989) ("[T]he argument for contractual rule making is
simple but powerful .... Contractually created rules will tend strongly to be pareto-superior rules:
they will make one or both parties better off, and neither party worse off.").
145. In Schwartz's paradigm, only the preferences of creditors and shareholders need be
taken into account in measuring efficiency. See Schwartz, supra note 3. at 1817-19. 1 have
accepted this paradigm only for purposes of argumentation. I agree with Professor Elizabeth
Warren that the appropriate measure of social welfare takes into account the impacts of business
activity on all affected persons. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Polic)making in an Imperfect
World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 356 (1993).
146. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 600 ('" [A procedure contract could work, as a practical
matter, only if the law imposes a consensus mechanism that substitutes for unanimity.").
147. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
148. Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 602 n.467.
149. See Tracht, supra note 95, at 354 (" With so little unsecured debt involved, the firm and
secured creditor could not have been motivated by the desire to profit from an inefficient waiver
that reallocates value from unsecured creditors. Thus, the waiver should be enforced.").
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contract, 50 and even he would imply it from the existence of the contract on
the public record for a specified period before bankruptcy. 5'
Relaxing the requirement for active, knowledgeable participation by all
creditors in bankruptcy contracting reduces transaction costs. At the same
time, however, it exposes the interests of nonparticipating creditors to the
redistributional impulses of the active, knowledgeable participants. One
cannot simply assume that if the redistributions thus achieved are small, the
accompanying declines in efficiency will be small as well. William
Whitford and I have shown that there is no necessary relationship between
the two. 52 The strength of the redistributional impulses evident in the
current pattern of bankruptcy contracting, combined with the largely
unexplored potential for even small redistributions to have large adverse
effects on efficiency, should give pause to future bankruptcy-contracting
theorists. Solutions that purport to take account of the preferences of all
creditors without actually doing so may be both redistributional and
inefficient.
150. See Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 118 (stating that whenever the debtor seeks to change
from a Chapter 7-only selection to a Chapter I I selection, "change in the corporate charter should
be allowed only with the consent of all of the creditors").
151. See supra note 8.
152. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 73, at 782-85 (providing an example showing large
distributional effects from attempts by reorganization management to achieve small efficiency
gains). A holdup that leads to a failure in contracting is an example of large efficiency effects
from attempts to achieve small distributional gains.
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